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INTRODUCTION: THE CONFLICT OVER THE RULE OF LAW
This symposium asks how we can quantify and evaluate what
judges do. Some of the papers are skeptical of attempts at
quantification.1 These questions are of importance to legal historians,
who frequently seek to link judicial behavior to larger cultural,
economic, and political trends. This essay suggests some ways that one
might quantify and thus measure an important and central issue for
legal historians: how did appellate judges define, work with, and alter
the “rule of law”?
DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW IN ANTEBELLUM
JURISPRUDENCE
In 1856, four years after Uncle Tom’s Cabin,2 Harriet Beecher
Stowe despaired at the fortunes of the antislavery forces. Though many
people throughout the country had wept upon reading of Tom’s death
Copyright © 2018 Alfred L. Brophy.
† D. Paul Jones Chairholder in Law, University of Alabama Law. I would like to thank
the participants in Duke Law School’s Evaluating Judging, Judges, and Judicial Institutions
conference for their assistance with these thoughts, especially Mitu Gulati, David Klein, and
David Levi. This Article originally appeared on the Legal Workshop as part of the Duke Law
Journal’s 2010 “Symposium on Evaluating Judging, Judges, and Judicial Institutions.”
1. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, The Costs of Judging Judges by
the Numbers, LEGAL WORKSHOP (DUKE L.J., Feb. 25, 2010).
2. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN (Mary R. Reichardt ed., Ignatius
Press 2009) (1852).
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at the hands of Simon Legree at the end of the novel, the abolitionists
had seemingly won few converts to their cause. The end of slavery
seemed as far away as ever. A majority of politicians, voters, and judges
supported the ideas that fugitive slaves must be returned to their
owners, that Congress should refrain from interference in the
institution of slavery, and that a utilitarian calculus of the costs of
abolition and the benefits of slavery favored the continuation of
slavery. Especially in the courts, the rhetoric that this nation must
uphold the rule of law and return fugitive slaves to their owners—and
otherwise support the law of slavery—proved compelling. Stowe
wondered why this was: how could people feel the inhumanity of
slavery and yet uphold the slave law? Her novel, Dred: A Tale of the
Great Dismal Swamp, addressed adherence to the rule of law by judges,
politicians, and religious leaders, and thus offered something of an
answer.3
One important subplot of Dred derived from North Carolina
Supreme Court Justice Thomas Ruffin’s 1829 opinion in State v. Mann.4
In that case, Ruffin freed Mann from criminal liability for abusing a
slave in his custody.5 Yet Ruffin acknowledged that the decision he had
made was a hard one. He wrote of the conflict he felt between his
feelings and his duty as a magistrate. “The struggle,” Ruffin observed
in the first paragraph of the opinion, “in the Judge’s own breast
between the feelings of the man, and the duty of the magistrate is a
severe one, presenting strong temptation to put aside such questions,
if it be possible.”6 Yet, he told his readers he had to issue a decision
against liability. “[I]t is criminal in a Court to avoid any responsibility
which the laws impose. With whatever reluctance therefore it is done,
the Court is compelled to express an opinion upon the extent of the
dominion of the master over the slave in North-Carolina.”7 Ruffin
emphasized that the master (or possessor in this case—Mann had
rented the slave he abused) must have uncontrolled authority over the
body of the slave. “The power of the master must be absolute, to render
the submission of the slave perfect,” Ruffin grimly observed.8

3. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, DRED: A TALE OF THE GREAT DISMAL SWAMP (Robert
S. Levine ed., Penguin Books 2006) (1852).
4. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
5. Id. at 268.
6. Id. at 264.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 266.
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Judge Ruffin’s honesty caught the attention of Stowe and of other
abolitionists, too, for they realized that Ruffin had exposed the difficult
truth at the heart of the law of slavery. And they exploited Ruffin’s
honesty. Stowe wrote in 1853, in the nonfiction A Key to Uncle Tom’s
Cabin, that she was sorry that “such a man, with such a mind, should
have been merely an expositor and not a reformer of law.”9 She came
to the conclusion that Ruffin was not a reformer because judges
followed legal logic: “[i]t is often and evidently not because judges are
inhuman or partial but because they are logical and truthful, that they
announce from the bench in the calmest manner, decisions which one
would think might make the earth shudder and the sun turn pale.”10 It
was the cold logic that led to so many perverse conclusions: “Every act
of humanity of every individual owner is an illogical result from the
legal definition . . . . The decisions of American law-books show
nothing so much as this severe, unflinching accuracy of logic.”11
Stowe explored this adherence to legal logic in more depth in
Dred. In that novel, she constructed a fictional judge, Justice Clayton
of the North Carolina Supreme Court, who was antislavery in private,
yet issued a proslavery decision.12 The decision Stowe put into the
fictional Justice Clayton’s hands almost exactly replicated the text of
State v. Mann. The morning before Justice Clayton issued his decision,
he spoke with his wife about it. When she asked why he was ruling in
favor of the abuser, he said “[a] Judge can only perceive and declare.
What I see, I must speak, though it go against all my feelings and all
my sense of right.”13 Although antislavery advocates were unhappy
retreating to the terms of legalist logic, this behavior was a recurring
theme of the antebellum judiciary.14
Stowe seemed perfectly willing to concede that there is something
of a common-law method of legal logic and that applying that logic—
which included a utilitarian calculus of the costs and benefits of a rule
that protected slaves against abuse—yielded proslavery results.
Proslavery literature often advocated such analysis. For instance,

9. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, A KEY TO UNCLE TOM’S CABIN 79 (Boston, John P. Jewett
& Co. 1853) (emphasis omitted).
10. Id. at 82.
11. Id.
12. STOWE, supra note 3, at 16.
13. Id. at 350.
14. See, e.g., STOWE, supra note 9, at 104 (discussing State v. Mann).
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Thomas R.R. Cobb’s An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery15
combined two lines of thought. First, a historical interpretation of
slavery made it seem close to universal and also humane. For instance,
Cobb argued that enslaved people produced more and often led better
lives than free workers. Under Cobb’s worldview, slavery was better
for the slaves, as well as their owners. The second line of thought held
that judges should decide cases according to principles of logic and law,
which he believed were distinct from passions favoring slaves. Those
principles were based often on the seeming ubiquity of slavery and on
its purported utility as well. There was a strong sense, even among
abolitionists, that the law was proslavery and that abiding by the rule
of law would yield a proslavery result.16
Yet others interpreted the meaning of “the law” differently. They
did not think that the law was so firmly proslavery as did Ruffin or
Cobb. For instance, Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 1852 speech in Concord,
Massachusetts against the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 expressed
surprise at the number of law books that seemed to contemplate
introducing natural justice—what was commonly called at that time the
“higher law.” Emerson read the legal literature as supporting—rather
than opposing—a doctrine of “higher law,” which had been so heavily
criticized by legal thinkers:
15. THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (Univ. of Ga. Press 1999) (1858).
16. The first part of Cobb’s treatise (“An Historical Sketch of Slavery”), id. at xxxv–xxxvii,
was grounded in the extensive literature on the contemporary practice of slavery. Cobb’s
utilitarian argument about the necessity of slavery and the impracticality of emancipation suggest
that his scholarship was an early form of legal realism. These arguments appeared in many places
in Southern legal writing, including in Georgia Supreme Court Justice Ebenezer Starnes’s novel,
The Slaveholder Abroad, which included an appendix comparing crime rates in slave and free
states. See EBENEZER STARNES, THE SLAVEHOLDER ABROAD 465–512 (Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott & Co. 1860). The focus on proslavery empiricism came just as antislavery writers also
turned toward empiricism. Thus, William Goodell’s The American Slave Code in Theory and
Practice looked to the law as it was on the books (proslavery) and in operation (even more
proslavery). See WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(Negro Universities Press 1968) (1853).
The latter part of Cobb’s treatise develops the law internally, but he draws upon the historical
sketch when discussing comity. He suggests that slavery is so ubiquitous that it exists before and
without positive law and that states should, therefore, recognize the property rights of
slaveholders traveling through free jurisdictions. COBB, supra note 15, at 168–71 (critiquing
Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.), for its origins in excitement and sentiment
rather than legal logic and concluding, “{w}ithout desiring in any manner to disparage the
deservedly great reputation of the great jurist that delivered this opinion, it is nevertheless
unquestionably true, and so admitted by his biographers and eulogists, that a prominent defect in
his character was a want of that moral courage (that my Lord Coke possessed in such an eminent
degree) that could withstand every influence when the law demanded his obeisance”)).
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A few months ago, in my dismay at hearing that the Higher Law
was reckoned a good joke in the courts, I took pains to look into a few
law-books. I had often heard that the Bible constituted a part of every
technical law library, and that it was a principle in law that immoral
laws are void.
I found, accordingly, that the great jurists, Cicero, Grotius, Coke,
Blackstone, Burlamaqui, Montesquieu, Vattel, Burke, Mackintosh,
Jefferson, do all affirm this. I have no intention to recite these
passages I had marked: such citation indeed seems to be something
cowardly (for no reasonable person needs a quotation from
Blackstone to convince him that white cannot be legislated to be
black), and shall content myself with reading a single passage.
Blackstone admits the sovereignty “antecedent to any positive
precept, of the law of Nature,” among whose principles are, “that we
should live on, should hurt nobody, and should render unto every one
his due,” etc. “No human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this.”
“Nay, if any human law should allow or enjoin us to commit a crime”
(his instance is murder), “we are bound to transgress that human law;
or else we must offend both the natural and divine.”17

Out of these conflicting viewpoints emerged serious discussion of
what “the rule of law” meant and the origins of law in positive
legislation, in the long-term customs of people around the world, and
in natural moral sense. Despite the frequent invocations of it by judges,
we still have a difficult time deciding whether a decision represents the
rule of law—or something else, like the rule of sentiment.
Among legal historians in particular, there has been surprisingly
little consideration of the quantifiable aspects of the question of just
what “the rule of law” means and how to measure whether judges
adhere to the rule of law. Yet some of the key questions that legal
historians have asked about judges’ behavior are susceptible to
quantitative exploration. In particular, I am interested in how to
measure what “the rule of law” means and in how expressions of
ideology may be measured in judicial opinions. I will discuss below
several examples of how to begin to do this.

17. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The Fugitive Slave Law, in 11 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 178, 190 (Edward Waldo Emerson ed., 1903) (emphasis omitted).
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I. ASSESSING JUDGES: HISTORY’S METHODS
Legal historians frequently view judges as dependent variables—
as gauges of larger intellectual and cultural movements, or,
alternatively and more rarely, as gauges of how cultural movements do
not penetrate law. Perhaps because legal historians have focused so
much attention on law as an artifact of culture (Lawrence Friedman’s
American Law in the 20th Century18 comes to mind here), they have
had relatively little concern for the assessment of whether judges are
good at what they do. Thus, instead of focusing on judges as
autonomous individuals, they analyze judges’ output as it is affected by
external factors, like ideology, culture, and economy.
In some models, judges (and judges’ opinions) may be the vehicles
for implementing changes impelled by economic and cultural thought.
One tradition sees judges as reshaping law to promote positive
economic results.19 Some of Richard Posner’s earliest work, in which
judges are more or less fungible, provided a quantitative assessment of
the changes in nineteenth-century tort law.20 The same is true for more
recent work in economic history, like Jenny Wahl’s The Bondsman’s
Burden: An Economic Analysis of the Common Law of Southern
Slavery,21 which treats judges as a homogeneous group as it reveals the
economic orientation underlying Southern law across forty years of
opinions.
In each of those instances, there is an account of judges remaking
the law. But there is no sense of whether they have made those changes
according to the rule of law or on an ad hoc basis. Nor is it clear which
judges do this well and which poorly: even when judges are the
independent variables who remake law to promote economic growth,
we have little sense of judges themselves—they do not emerge as
individual actors. Instead, the judiciary appears as an undifferentiated
group of men. One can read for pages in Professor Morton Horwitz’s
Transformation22 and in Professor William Novak’s The People’s
Welfare,23 both books centered on common-law adjudication, without
18. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY (2002).
19. See, e.g., MORTON J, HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860 (1977).
20. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
21. JENNY BOURNE WAHL, THE BONDSMAN’S BURDEN: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
COMMON LAW OF SOUTHERN SLAVERY (1998).
22. HORWITZ, supra note 19.
23. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
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seeing the name of any judge. Judges, despite their differing political
and religious orientations, and their differing skills and training, are
seemingly interchangeable.
Historians have sometimes looked closely at what judges
contribute as independent actors, though even in these instances the
picture often emerges that judges are vehicles for expression of their
culture. We hear about individual judges through biographies, which
are the legal historians’ form of “thick description.” Yet such a massive
work of judicial biography as Professor Kent Newmyer’s Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Story24—brilliant legal history as it is—threatens
to lose the larger story in the details of individual cases and arguments
around them. Thick descriptions may, nevertheless, help provide a
reasonable level of generalization about how judges reason.25 For
example, Judge Posner’s jurisprudential biography of Justice Benjamin
Cardozo26 and Richard Polenberg’s Cardozo biography27 focus on
Cardozo’s ideas without getting lost in so much detail of the lives of
judges. Along those lines, collective biographies, like Professor G.
Edward White’s The American Judicial Tradition and, more recently,
Professor Timothy Huebner’s Southern Judicial Tradition, employ a
similar methodology that focuses on ideas in opinions.28
While one is talking about “thick description” and analysis of
judges in history, one book stands out. Among the leading legal-history
studies of the last several decades that deal with judges and judicial
methods is Professor G. Edward White’s Marshall Court and Cultural
Change.29 It links the decisions of the Marshall Court to larger trends
in American culture, which emphasized the value of the union and the
24. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE
OLD REPUBLIC (1986).
25. Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial
Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1554 (2009); H. Jefferson Powell, A Response to Professor
Knight, 58 DUKE L.J. 1725, 1727 (2009) (focusing on the desire for generalization and empiricists’
ability provide it).
26. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990).
27. RICHARD POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDOZO: PERSONAL VALUES
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1997).
28. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION (2d ed. 1988); TIMOTHY
HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION (1999); see also Richard A. Posner, Judicial
Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 502, 520 (1995) (“{T}he obvious alternative to studying the judge’s
life is studying his opinions.”); A Conversation with Judge Richard A. Posner, 58 DUKE L.J. 1807,
1821 (2009) (suggesting that studying judges’ opinions is a more useful way to understand judicial
behavior than conventional biography).
29. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835
(1988).
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promotion of economic growth. White views Marshall’s opinions as
important supports for those missions. He does this through a
comparison of Marshall’s opinions with other key cultural expressions,
such as James Fenimore Cooper’s novels.30 The question remains,
though, whether there are some quantitative tools that scholars can
employ to bring more precision to judicial decision-making.
II. ASSESSING JUDGES: QUANTITATIVE METHODS
Because of the nature of questions that legal historians have asked
in recent years, they have rarely made wide-ranging assessments of
judges’ quality or of their adherence to key principles, like the rule of
law (or even what people might mean by it). Perhaps, though, a
systematic, quantitative approach can bring more precision to the two
key issues: how judges operate (that is, how they find and use
precedent, and how they write opinions) and what determines (or at
least correlates with) outcomes.31
Maybe we can begin to understand and measure the quality of
judges with some assessment of their peers’ assessments (in part by
citations and maybe also by how often they are mentioned by name in
opinions). Or we may look to the energy judges expended on their jobs:
in terms of the number of opinions they write; their longevity on the
court; the length of their opinions; and the number of their
concurrences and dissents.32
Further, one might look to their learning and aspirations: what
cases they cite, how far afield to they look for sources of law, how often
they reach beyond their own jurisdiction’s opinions. One might even
consider whether they look to other countries’ opinions, or beyond
readily available treatises, and even to non-legal sources. There are
other ways to try to tease out judges’ aspirations, such as how often
they use key phrases. A search for these phrases might reveal examples
of judges’ creativity in language. For instance, a search for
“Daguerreotype” (an early form of photography) reveals how quickly

30. Id. at 40–48 (1988). G. Edward White’s The American Judicial Tradition makes a similar,
though broader, claim about the centrality of certain principles (like the rule of law) to American
judges throughout history.
31. Knight, supra note 25, at 1554.
32. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges According to Citation Bias
(As a Means to Reduce Bias), 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279 (2007).
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mid-nineteenth-century judges adopted allusions to the new
technologies of their era—to light, darkness, and natural right.33
There are, yet, some finer distinctions a quantitative legal history
might make in terms of assessing the project of judging. As the vignette
with which I began this Essay illustrates, persistent questions remain
about what it means to judge according to the rule of law. And so I
would like to see some quantitative precision brought to the
exploration of whether judges abide by the rule of law.
I would like to suggest two places in particular that we might
attempt to bring quantitative precision to understand the meaning of
“the rule of law.” First, I hope to return to Professor Robert Cover’s
ground: of judges who interpreted the proslavery nature of the
common law and the Constitution. Cover’s key question in Justice
Accused: Anti-Slavery and the Judicial Process34 was why judges who
were antislavery in private issued proslavery opinions. The answer
turns on a constellation of arguments, which the judges themselves
advanced, about the meaning of the Constitution and about the utility
of a proslavery interpretation to the preservation of the Union. These
arguments appeared in Fugitive Slave Act cases, as well as in state cases
interpreting the rights of enslaved people who traveled with their
owners to free states and then back into slave states, and in cases
interpreting slaveowners’ wills that attempted to free their enslaved
property. We need to graph them over time: how frequently were they
invoked, how central were they to the result, and which opinions were
subsequently cited? Moreover, what are the geographic, temporal, and
factual determinants of a conclusion that the utility of slavery trumped
considerations of the humanity of individual slaves? That is, in what
states and when did judges refer to the utility of slavery? In what kinds
of cases did they reference the utility of slavery? This would bring

33. There were several references to Daguerreotype images in the years before the Civil
War. See, e.g., Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495, 505 (1850) (construing the exchange of
Daguerreotypes as evidence of promise to marry); Maddox v. Simmons, 31 Ga. 512, 531 (1860)
(Lumpkin, J.) (noting that Judge Harris’ opinion, which was reprinted at the end of Judge
Lumpkin’s, “will daguerreotype to posterity the peculiarities of our most excellent brother far
better than any post-mortem eulogy of ours” (emphasis omitted)); Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Ga. 146,
157 (1847) (“ Is not, I ask, the transfer from Lichton to Dixon & Lichton the Daguerreotype
likeness of the one prohibited . . . ?”); Tritt v. Crotzer, 13 Pa. 451, 454 (1850) (“{T}here are cases
in which the law is portrayed by a daguerreotype from nature and feeling, and approved by the
impulses of a sound conscience; and does not result from abstractions of positive institute, found
and established in a different and incongruous state of society . . . .”).
34. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975).
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greater precision to what judges meant by “the rule of law” in fugitiveslave cases.
Second, I suggest matching the reasoning styles of judges across
similar cases at a similar time as a more ambitious piece of a project to
quantitatively gauge the ways that political ideology linked to judicial
opinions.35 For example, William W. Fisher has suggested that Whig
political theory predominated in vested-rights cases in the years
between the Revolution and the Civil War.36 To investigate this claim,
one could compare the political affiliations of judges against the
appearance of Whig or Democrat doctrine in their opinions. Whigs, for
instance, viewed expansively the contracts that corporations made with
the government and argued that an expansive contracts-clause
jurisprudence was necessary to protect investments in corporations and
encourage technological and financial progress.37 Democrats, by
contrast, invoked arguments about the inalienability of certain
governmental powers, like the right of eminent domain. Particularly
helpful are cases in which there are dissents, which highlight the
disjunction between reasoning styles.38
There are two things to focus on in this analysis of Whig and
Democrat judges. First, we need to look at the reasoning styles of
judges, not just the outcomes. And, closely related to that, we need to
develop systematic ways of measuring rhetoric in judicial opinions to
assess reasoning styles. This may bring more precision to judicial
reasoning styles than a “yes/no,” or “agreement/disagreement”
variable.
A lot of data is buried in the hundreds of volumes of state and
federal case reports before the Civil War. It is awaiting the systematic
35. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt
to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1905 (2009)
(noting the difficulty of disentangling judges’ views on ideology from their views on law). As
Judge Edwards and Professor Livermore note, some factors are quite difficult to code for. When
these factors appear, studying judicial rhetoric in conjunction with citation patterns appears more
promising.
36. William W. Fisher, Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private
Property: 1760–1860, 39 EMORY L.J. 65, 112–20 (1990) (detailing Whig styles of reasoning).
37. Justice Story’s dissent in Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), is the best-known of a long series of vested-rights
cases that prominently featured Whig ideology and economic arguments, see id. at 584 (Story, J.,
dissenting).
38. Among the many state vested-rights cases with dissents in the antebellum era, which
present the opportunity for highlighting disjunctions between Whig and Democrat ideology, are
Fisher v. Cokerill, 21 Ky. (5 T.B. Mon.) 129, 133 (1827) and Commercial Bank of Rodney v.
Mississippi, 12 Miss. (4 S. & M.) 439 (1845).
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study made possible by quantitative methods. For instance, although
there are some prominent Whig jurists—Justice Joseph Story and
Judge Lemuel Shaw come to mind—a systematic study may provide a
sense of how much the political doctrine of one party appears in the
reasoning of the adherents of the other party. A systematic study may
provide a better understanding of whether there was a unified judicial
mind on such a critical and highly contentious area as vested rights. Did
Democrats and Whigs largely think alike on vested rights, or, as one
might expect from studying the statements of Democrat and Whig
politicians, did they think differently? One way to approach this
question is to look at several vested-rights opinions that were decided
by Southern state supreme courts almost simultaneously during the
Civil War. In 1864, the Confederate Congress passed a statute that
made men who had already provided a substitute for military service
subject to the draft. The statute was challenged in several states as a
violation of the property rights of the men who provided substitutes.
Five state supreme courts issued nearly simultaneous opinions on this
issue. All upheld the statute; only one judge dissented. Those opinions
contain recurrent issues of law, economics, and politics, and they
provide a view of how Democrat judges reasoned differently from
Whig judges. The Democrats were more comfortable retreating to
arguments about the state’s power to compel service than were the
Whigs, who took narrower approaches to the question and narrowly
construed the initial “contract."39
Some important quantitative work of this kind has been done
already by those looking at judges’ use of economic analysis in the
nineteenth century.40 A substantial body of work already considers

39. One might contrast, for instance, the Georgia opinion, Daly v. Harris, 33 Ga. Supp. 38
(1864), written by Whig Justice Charles F. Jenkins, which construed narrowly the contract, with
the bolder arguments of Democratic justices Mathias Manly of North Carolina and John Phelan
of Alabama, see Gatlin v. Walton, 60 N.C. (Win.) 325, 333 (1864); Ex parte Tate, 39 Ala. 254, 255
(1864). For some initial explorations, see Alfred L. Brophy, The Intersection of Property and
Slavery in Southern Legal Thought: From Missouri Compromise Through Civil War chs. 3, 6
(June 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
40. Dean David Levi reminds us that, although Judge Posner recommends that judges
modify the law in ways that produce societal benefit, it is a mighty difficult task to know how a
change might affect society: “{J}udges who think that they know what is sensible or beneficial
merely by dint of education or intellect are just as formalist as the ‘legalists’ to the degree that
they rely upon a fixed set of theories of human nature, economics, history, or political economy
out in the ether to deduce rules of law, rather than building such rules from the ground up by
responding to the particular facts of a particular situation and dispute.” David F. Levi, Autocrat
of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1805 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES
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whether judges self-consciously seek economic efficiency (or utility, to
use the parlance of the antebellum United States). But my hope is to
look more quantitatively across a spectrum of decisions to answer the
question: to what extent was the “rule of law” understood to be a stable
or a dynamic construct? It is an issue of identifying facets that can be
quantified and aggregated so that we can have a fuller picture of a very
complex system of thought and action. As we begin to understand how
judges thought, perhaps that can illuminate “how judges think.”

THINK (2008)). This critique is increasingly raised against law-and-economics interpretations of
the common law: judges may not have known how their decisions would affect welfare. See, e.g.,
Gillian Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 616 (1992).

